What would nano regulation look like?

The office of Gene Technology Regulator is a good example of a regulatory system where the precautionary principle is not actually in operation - where it should be. The definition of environment is extremely narrow (it doesn't have to be under the Gene Tech Act but it has been interpreted narrowly by Sue Meeks) and it doesn't consider social or economic impacts in any real way.

The OGTR is designed to approve GMO's and is under a lot of political pressure to do this. It is hardly an objective body. How do you think we could avoid making this mistake again with a nano regulator? 

John H.

Although in practical terms regulation of technical and economic activity is far laxer than it should be or needs to be, I am left with the feeling that the precautionary principle is a vehicle that we can never win with. I can't remember the strict statement of the principle but my belief is that applied rigourously it gives grounds for stopping almost anything. It isn't, as pointed out above, possible to predict consequences in their entirety. Thus the precautionary principle would lead to a society that would be far more conservative that most people would accept. This includes me. Many of the progressive changes that I support could be easily defeated on the basis of the principle. 

I would suggest that a different basis of regulation (perhaps utopia) that would actually fit progressive politics better would be one of priority and risk. The blurb about nanotechnology is that it will no doubt solve poverty, environmental degredation and dandruff. So there is public agreement on what the outstanding priority problems are. The question we should ask is then, is this the most effective, simplest and least apparently risky way of solving these problems, among the other possible solutions? If it was the only way apparent to stop the earth crashing into the sun or something similar, we might conclude that the risks and uncertainties are worthwhile. Given that we have available many other more conservative and productive courses of action available to us it is unclear why we would invest resources in nano research at all - let alone have to consider the question of regulation. 

In response to Andrew's comments.

Taken to the extreme, the abstract application of the precautionary principle could, in theory, be used to justify stopping virtually any development. In practice, it's application is based far narrow than that and it is applied in the context of an analysis of scientific risk. For example, nobody is arguing that a particular new variety of electric toothbrush be banned just in case something might go wrong despite no evidence to suggest any problems. However, in the case of nanoparticles, there is a growing body of empirical, scientific evidence, backed up by recommendations from scientific bodies such as the Royal Society that there are not only risks, but demonstrable hazards associated with many nano scale particles.

In these cases, the precuationary principle basically advocates that a lack of evidence should not hinder the application of regulations or other actions to safeguard human or environmental health (this is a rough translation).

In 1990, when the International Panel on Climate Change issued their first report, the precautionary principle supported urgent action to prevent dangerous climate change. Industry (coal, oil etc) and many world governments argued against precaution, calling for more evidence before taking action. Now, after 15 years of inaction we have a very very serious problem.

In relation to nanotechnology, precautionary regulation of health and environmental risks is only one issue - and one that is relatively straighforward to think about (if not act upon). A much more difficult area is that of social and economic impacts. Given the juggernaut of technological development, it is difficult to even know how to have conversations about limiting the development of technologies that might have serious longer term social and economic impacts.

 This is one area where we definitely need to develop some new models. The issue, at a basic level, is democracy.

John H.

http://johnswheelbarrow.blogspot.com 

You could operate a jury system where you have random selection of jury members from different parts of the country who are then advised by a panel of experts. We trust a random jury system for court decisions that involve life sentences, murder etc - so why not trust this kind of system for approval or new technologies? It is probably the only way that we could avoid the development of an expert elite that would open to the kind of political sellout that we see in any bureacracy (note - the bureaucracy in Australia used to be far more independent, frank and fearless than it is now). 

I agree that trying to remove institutional and political bias from a regulatory system is a good idea - and a jury system may be one way of doing this - but it seems as though there is also a real problem of definition with nanotechnology and new technology in general.

What is new? How do you draw a boundary between current systems/technologies and new ones that have disruptive negative impacts? With GE foods it was clear, with manufactured nanoparticles it is probably quite straightforward as well, but how do you even categorise let alone evaluate the kind of creeping technologies relating to human enhancement for example?

John H.

I like the idea of the jury system - in fact have just been reading Saul and was tempted to propose it myself. There are practical problems - the level of literacy in techno-social areas may actually be less than in matters criminal for eg.

 Definitional problems might come within the ambit of the jury. Or perhaps the institution could include functionaries such as the judge and the legal teams that provide argument and interpretation. Or indeed the jury could be empowered to seek or appoint advice and research within certain practical limitations - like seeking professional advice.

On a more timely note, the Senate enquiries actually seem to do this job - at least as well as the personnel of the Senate allow (up to the electorate; no excuses here). I seem to recall that part of the Howard agenda is to abolish or radically reduce the effectiveness of this practice. 

It seems straightforward enough. A regulatory body similar to the federal office of gene technology regulator could be a one stop shop for all things nano - and then refer things to other departments for specific risk assessments.

The Office of Gene Technology Regulator is basicaly a rubber stamping agency. Their modus operandi is the exact opposite of the precautionary principle. They assume that GMO's are safe until proven otherwise.

The risks posed by GE organisms and by nanoparticles are such that a far more precautionary regulatory system is required - one which demonstrates safety to a far higher degree than the ludicrous notion of 'substantial equivalence' upon which the approval of GE foods is based. 

The OGTR also does not consider social, ethical or economic impacts - which are in many ways much more difficult to deal with. 

John H.

http://johnswheelbarrow.blogspot.com 

John observes that the OGTR is a rubber stamping agency whose actual policy is a safe until proven otherwise. Presumably this is a political influence (ie from the government) rather than an institutional tendency bound up with the culture of the public service. How much would the OGTR's performance improve (from the green point of view) if the government held and enforced a precautionary policy? What in practical terms would the other impacts of this policy be? One might be challenges in the WTO or under other free-trade agreements, that seem to implicitly militate against precautionary regulation. Another might be that the principle is unimplementable for the reasons I suggested earlier. But these aside (there are ways to manage or finese either of these), I'm interested in the idea that the problem is less dramatic than we might be making it. It should in theory be easier to change policy or change governments than it is to change the institutions that provide the continuity for the change to occur.

 It is also interesting that John uses the notion of a "more precautionary" approach, suggesting that the principle is not superlative or absolute. I think that this would redress my objections to the principle somewhat, although it raises the issue of how precautionary do we want and how do we elect or institutionalise the values or epistemology required to make decisions in line with the "right" amount of precaution.

 The issues of social and ethical impacts is very difficult and I tend to think that they do require a back to the drawing board philosophical consideration - I think John was suggesting this earlier. The notion of "impacts" is also quite specific to the current governmental way of thinking - I would tend to consider ethical implications rather than impacts (the latter seems to externalise ethics from the locus of action).

We are in a very difficult position as far as social impacts or implications go because we are far from a metanarrative that is broadly accepted. Social impacts can collapse to simply the politics of existing groupings and I don't think that this is a good basis for progressive governance (the social impact of stopping mining is lots of unemployed miners - and the destruction of the major union stronghold in Australia). Someone needs to craft a vision of society that can provide some sort of guidance in the face of structural changes that would otherwise seem incohate, arbitrary and vicious to the people enduring them. In this sense I again seek to turn the question into the positive, although the onus is still on the proponent: before we address the question of whether this technology is safe, first prove to us that it is worth doing at all?